Hard rivalry for Buddhism’s soft power
September 8, 2025
In ‘Hard rivalry for Buddhism’s soft power’ (Asia Times, August 2025), Associate Professor Jack Meng-Tat Chia (NUS History) explores how Buddhist relics, rituals, and networks have become tools of diplomacy across Asia. While the spotlight often falls on India and China’s competition for influence, Chia draws attention to Singapore’s quieter but no less significant role in shaping ties through religion.
During the 1980s, well before formal diplomatic relations were established between Singapore and the People’s Republic of China, Buddhist networks were already creating avenues of connection. At the centre of this effort was Venerable Hong Choon, then president of the Singapore Buddhist Federation. Between 1982 and 1990, Hong Choon travelled to China eight times, holding meetings with senior Chinese leaders including Vice President Ulanhu, Buddhist leader Zhao Puchu, and the Panchen Lama. These were not simply religious exchanges; they served as valuable informal channels of dialogue at a time when political ties remained sensitive.
A milestone came in 1985, when Hong Choon led an interfaith delegation from Singapore to China. This was a symbolic step that presented the ability of religious actors to engage across borders where governments could not yet fully do so. The impact was felt three years later, when Zhao Puchu visited Singapore in 1988 and was received not only as a Buddhist leader but as a high-level envoy by then Deputy Prime Minister Ong Teng Cheong. Such moments revealed how religion could serve as a form of ‘track two’ diplomacy, quietly laying the groundwork for state-to-state relations.
This pattern of cultural bridge-building continued into the 21st century. In 2014, the Asian Civilisations Museum partnered with China’s Shaanxi Provincial Cultural Relics Bureau to present an exhibition titled ‘Secrets of the Fallen Pagoda: Treasures from Famen Temple and the Tang Court’. Featuring Buddhist relics associated with the Tang dynasty, the exhibition highlighted the deep historical links between China and the wider region, while also reinforcing bilateral goodwill. Though framed as a cultural showcase, it carried a diplomatic subtext: shared Buddhist heritage as a platform for stronger ties.
For Singapore, these experiences illustrate an alternative model of diplomacy. Lacking the scale of major powers, the city-state has often turned to creative forms of engagement to build trust and foster cooperation. Religious and cultural diplomacy – whether through Buddhist networks, museum partnerships, or interfaith exchanges – provides a channel that complements traditional statecraft.
In a region where Buddhist diplomacy is increasingly entwined with strategic competition between India and China, Singapore’s story demonstrates how smaller states can act as intermediaries and bridge-builders. Rather than competing for influence, Singapore has leveraged its position as a multicultural hub to nurture connections, open channels of dialogue, and showcase the soft power of cultural heritage.
As Chia suggests, the lessons of Singapore’s quiet role in Buddhist diplomacy remain relevant today. In an era of geopolitical rivalry, cultural and religious networks can continue to serve as subtle but powerful instruments of trust-building and cooperation.
Read ‘Hard rivalry for Buddhism’s soft power’ here.
