September 7, 2026

Singapore’s reputation for neutrality and trust has long been an asset to its strong economic position, but what happens if this reputation slowly becomes exploited and unravelled? In ‘Fake recruiters and elite capture: “Singapore Washing” gets even riskier amid heightened geopolitical tensions’ (Academia SG, August 2026), Associate Professor Chong Ja Ian (NUS Political Science) argues that intensifying major power competition has made Singapore’s traditionally open and cooperative posture increasingly difficult to maintain without stronger safeguards. Recent reports of fake Singapore-based think tanks and consultancies recruiting former officials and researchers suggest that Singapore’s credibility is being exploited to legitimise questionable organisations, including through fabricated profiles and institutional affiliations.

These incidents reveal a particularly serious dimension of foreign interference: elite capture. Rather than attempting to influence society broadly through the media, academia or civil society, foreign actors may gain greater returns by cultivating individuals close to policymaking. Former officials, government-linked researchers and other well-connected figures possess institutional knowledge, networks and potentially privileged information, making them attractive targets for intelligence gathering and political influence.

Chong argues that existing legislation, including the Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA), may not sufficiently address these vulnerabilities. He  also questions the apparent inconsistency in Singapore’s regulatory response. Despite possessing extensive legal powers under FICA, POFMA, the Online Criminal Harms Act (OCHA) and other legislation, Singapore has seemingly not ordered the removal or blocking of the purported fake think tanks and consultancies. This contrasts with the government’s June 2026 use of OCHA against AI-generated social-media content that allegedly sought to inflame anti-Indian sentiment. Chong further observes that enforcement targeted conventional social media platforms, while comparable material remained accessible on several China-based platforms, with no clear public explanation for the difference.

The broader concern is that Singapore-washing no longer simply involves foreign companies using Singapore as a convenient corporate base, and now extends beyond corporate relocation into reputational risks, money laundering, foreign interference and espionage, exploiting Singapore’s credibility and global connections. Chong therefore challenges the assumption that openness and neutrality alone can shield Singapore from intensifying major power rivalry. As geopolitical competition deepens, staying out of the fray does not mean Singapore will remain untouched by it, and protecting the Singapore brand will require greater transparency and safeguards against foreign threats.

Read the Academia SG article here.