POLITICAL ECONOMY: Expressive Politics – A Model of Electoral Competition with Animus and Cognitive Dissonance; Professor Stefan KRASA (University of Illinois)

Abstract

We study a model of electoral competition that incorporates both the instrumental and expressive benefits of candidate position taking. In the model, voters care about standard policy concerns as well as two expressive considerations: the psychological costs of deviating from one’s own preferred policy and the psychological benefits of antagonizing an out-group. Whereas concerns about cognitive dissonance consistently temper candidate extremism, the effects of animus are non-monotonic—exacerbating policy divisions when baseline levels are low, and triggering one candidate’s capitulation (as distinct from both candidates’ moderation) when they are high. We further show that candidates become more polarized when a government routinely fails to translate policies into law. And when policy disagreements run high and communications are siloed, candidates have incentives to stoke inter-group animosities. The findings have broad implications for our understandings of political polarization, separation of powers, an increasingly fragmented media market, and partisan sorting and representation.

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