APPLIED MICRO: Who Becomes a Local Politician? Evidence from Rural India; Dr Mamidipudi Ramakrishna Sharan (University of Maryland, College Park)

Abstract

Can local democracy in areas of weak state capacity attract competent leaders while simultaneously ensuring adequate representation of disadvantaged groups? Matching census data of 95 million rural residents and nearly 1 million local politicians from Bihar, we uncover the following facts about politicians' competence and representativeness. First, absent political quotas, Bihar's local electoral system comprises a "partially exclusive meritocracy". Politicians are from elite backgrounds, but within these elites, the more educated tend to contest and win. This reveals a trade-off: women, disadvantaged castes, lower-ranked candidates, and those in lower government tiers exhibit lower competence but greater representativeness. Although village characteristics like inequality, caste diversity and party presence influence selection patterns, they don’t change the partially exclusive meritocratic nature of the system. However, policy interventions can shape political selection. Our difference-in-differences analysis shows devolving financial powers attracts a larger pool of candidates. Two natural experiments on caste and gender quotas reveal that quotas broadly trade-off competence for representativeness. Finally, a close election RDD shows that more competent candidates are more knowledgeable and better connected to local elites. A conjoint experiment with 1105 citizens suggests that more educated candidates are perceived as more likely to win. Taken together, our findings highlight the significance of studying local democracy in understanding the causes and consequences of political selection.