MICRO THEORY: Professor Yuhta Ishii (Pennsylvania State University)

Long-Run Contracting with Uncertain Monitoring

How should a principal contract when the agent has private information not only about his preferences but also about the monitoring technology? We study how the principal can use time and tests to address this problem. A long signal history lets the principal distinguish among monitoring technologies, but only up to mimicry: the agent under one monitoring technology can pass the test for another whenever he can reproduce every signal distribution available under it. Using this observation, we show that the dynamic problem reduces to static mechanism design with evidence that embodies this mimicry relation. The static problem then delivers the set of action distributions and payoffs that the principal can virtually implement over the long run. The principal can attain all such outcomes using simple test contracts, which pay based on empirical signal frequencies across finitely many phases.

Date
Wednesday, 14 October 2026

Time
4pm to 5.30pm

Venue
In person Seminar
AS2-03-12 Lim Tay Boh Seminar Room (LTBSR)
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